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Recent Development
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-
U.C.C. FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GOVERNS
ACTIONS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES BASED ON
BREACH OF WARRANTY UNDER THE
U.C.C.
Wi/hams v. West Penn Power Co. (Pa. 1983)
On May 19, 1975, Daniel Banks, a partner in B & M Roofing Contrac-
tors,1 and his employee, Gerald Williams, suffered severe injuries when a
ladder platform hoist they were using contacted a high tension power line.2
Two years and one day later, Mr. and Mrs. Banks and Mr. Williams
brought suit against the power company, general contractor, builder, manu-
facturer and immediate seller, pleading counts in negligence, strict liability
and breach of warranty.
3
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs'
action was barred by Pennsylvania's two-year personal injury statute of limi-
tations.4 The trial court granted defendants' motion and dismissed plain-
tiffs' claims. 5 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that
Williams' breach of warranty claim was time-barred on the ground that Wil-
liams, as a third party, could not take advantage of the Pennsylvania com-
mercial code's four-year statute of limitations, which is identical to the
1. Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 502 Pa. 557, 561, 467 A.2d 811, 813
(1983). B & M Roofing Contractors had been hired to perform work at the Slove-
nian Hall Association of Broughton. Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 313 Pa.
Super. 461, 462, 460 A.2d 278, 279, affd in part and rev'd tn part, 502 Pa. 557, 467 A.2d
811 (1983).
2. 502 Pa. at 561, 467 A.2d at 813. The ladder conducted electricity from the
high tension wires through Mr. Banks and Mr. Williams, causing severe electrical
burns throughout their bodies. Id As a result, Mr. Williams lost two toes on his right
foot and Mr. Banks had his left leg amputated below the knee. Id. The complaint did
not indicate the date that the latter was purchased, but the brief of the manufacturer
claimed that the men were injured "the same day the ladder was purchased." Id
3. 313 Pa. Super. at 463, 460 A.2d at 279-80. The plaintiffs commenced the
trespass action on May 20, 1977, and then filed complaints in trespass and assumpsit
on June 29, 1977. Id., 460 A.2d at 279. The ladder was manufactured by Reimann
and Georger, Inc. and was purchased by B & M from Commercial Services Co. Id
4. 502 Pa. at 561, 467 A.2d at 813.
5. Id. The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas granted defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment in reliance on the decision in Salvador v. Atlantic Steel
Boiler Co. (Salvador II), 256 Pa. Super. 330, 389 A.2d 1148 (1978), aff'dper curtam,
492 Pa. 257, 424 A.2d 497 (1981). 502 Pa. at 561, 467 A.2d at 813. The trial court
interpreted Salvador II as holding that the two-year statute of limitations applied to
all breach of warranty actions seeking damages for personal injury. Id For a discus-
sion of Salvador II, see notes 52-57 and accompanying text infra.
(1195)
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Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provision. 6 Instead, the court held that
the plaintiffs had to rely on the two-year personal injury statute of limita-
tions. 7 However, the superior court permitted Banks, the direct purchaser,
to proceed against his immediate seller on the warranty claim reasoning that
the commercial code's four-year statute of limitations applied to warranty
actions brought by persons in privity of contract with the defendant.8 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 9 affirmed in part and reversed in part, hold-
tng that the Pennsylvania commercial code's four-year statute of limitations
applied to all breach of warranty claims brought under the code, regardless
of whether there was privity between the plaintiff and defendant and regard-
less of whether the plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries. Williams
v. West Penn Power Co., 502 Pa. 557, 467 A.2d 811 (1983).
Persons who are injured by defective products may seek compensation
for their injuries under various theories of liability. 10 Two such theories of
recovery are breach of implied warranty of merchantability and strict liabil-
ity in tort." A claim for breach of an implied warranty is contractual in
6. 313 Pa. Super. at 471, 460 A.2d at 284. Compare 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2725(1) (Purdon 1984) with U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978).
7. 313 Pa. Super. at 471, 460 A.2d at 284. Initially, the superior court found
that plaintiffs' counts in negligence and strict liability were barred by the applicable
two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 465, 460 A.2d at 281. The court then relied on
its holding in Salvador II in disposing of Williams' breach of warranty claim. Id
8. 313 Pa. Super. at 471, 460 A.2d at 284. The superior court gave a more
restricted reading to the holding in Salvador I1 than that of the trial court. Id The
superior court found that the reasoning of Salvador IIdid not extend to the situation
where the direct purchaser brings the cause of action against the seller. Id at 469-70,
460 A.2d at 283. It therefore distinguished the direct buyer from the third party and
applied the four-year U.C.C. statute of limitations to the former and the two-year
personal injury statute of limitations to the latter. Id. at 470-71, 460 A.2d at 283-84.
The superior court reasoned that the U.C.C. explicitly provided a four-year statute of
limitations for a cause of action brought by a direct purchaser and that that language
could not be ignored. Id at 470, 460 A.2d at 283. However, regarding the third
party warranty claim, the superior court adopted the analysis of Salvador II and al-
lowed the third party beneficiary action under the U.C.C., but applied the personal
injury statute of limitations. Id
9. The case was heard by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Nix, Larsen, Fla-
herty, McDermott, Hutchinson, and Zappala. Justice Nix delivered the opinion of
the Court. Justice Larsen concurred in the result.
10. See generally Shapo, A Representational Theoy of Consumer Protection. Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
11. The implied warranty of merchantability has been called a "first cousin" of
strict tort liability. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 343 (1980). Breach of warranty origially sounded in
tort and was characterized as a form of misrepresentation or fraud. Ames, The History
ofAssumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1888). In the late 1700's, however, the contractual
aspects of warranty were recognized and the form of action for breach of warranty
became that of assumpsit (contract). W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 634-35 (4th ed. 1971). "The seller's warranty is a curious hybrid, born of the
illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the law." Id. at 634.
A more notable example of legal miscegenation could hardly be cited than
,that' which produced the modern action for breach of warranty. Originally
sounding in tort, yet arising out of the warrantor's consent to be bound, it
1196 [Vol. 29: p. 1195
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nature, arising from a presumption that the seller impliedly warranted that
the goods were merchantable when sold.' 2 The implied warranty of
merchantability, as defined in section 2-314 of the U.C.C., 13 provides that
merchantable goods must be fit for the ordinary purpose for which such
goods are used. 4 In order to maintain an action for breach of implied war-
ranty, the plaintiff must establish the following: (1) the goods were sold by a
merchant, (2) the goods were not merchantable at the time of sale, (3) the
later ceased necessarily to be consensual, and at the same time came to lie
mainly in contract.
Note, Necessity for Prtviy of Contract in Warranties by Representation, 42 HARV. L. REV.
414, 414-15 (1929) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the implied warranty of
merchantability, see notes 12-16 and accompanying text tnfra. For a discussion of
strict tort liability, see notes 21-24 and accompanying text infra. In addition to an
action for breach of an implied warranty, an injured consumer may bring a cause of
action for breach of an express warranty or breach of an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. Set U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-315 (1978). An implied warranty
that the goods be fit for a particular purpose arises when the seller has reason to know
of a particular purpose for which the goods are required. See id. § 2-315. The con-
sumer may also sue under the negligence theory by claiming that the manufacturer
or supplier failed to exercise the care of a reasonable person in the process of prepara-
tion, manufacture or sale of the product. W. PROSSER, supra, at 644.
12. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 635. Such a warranty is imposed by law,
regardless of the seller's intention to make or avoid any warranty. Id. For this reason,
it has been said that designating a warranty as contract "is to speak the language of
pure fiction." Williston, Liabihityfor Honest Misrepresentations, 24 HARV. L. REV. 415,
420 (1911). See also Smith, Survivtg Fictions, 27 YALE L.J. 147 (1917).
13. While the principal case was decided under Pennsylvania law, the relevant
Pennsylvania law and the Uniform Commercial Code provisions are substantially the
same. Compare 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101-9507 (Purdon 1984) with U.C.C.
§ 1-101 to 9-507 (1978). Accordingly, references to the commercial code will be to
the U.C.C. in order to allow for more general application of the note's discussion and
analysis.
14. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1978). The implied warranty of merchantability
has been termed by far the most important warranty in the U.C.C. SeeJ. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 343. The implied warranty provides in pertinent part
as follows:
(1) Unless excluded or modified . . .a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind ...
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among
all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). Article 2 of the U.C.C. has been adopted in various forms in
all states except Louisiana. See 1 U.L.A. 1 (1984 Supp.).
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plaintiff suffered injury and damage to his person or property, (4) the inju-
ries were proximately caused by the defective nature of the goods, and
(5) the plaintiff notified the seller of the injury. 15 Should these elements be
proven, the plaintiff can recover for consequential damages, including dam-
ages for personal injuries. 16
However, many legal scholars and practitioners believed that due to
difficulties inherent in suing under warranty theory, the warranty action
under the U.C.C. did not offer the consumer adequate protection. 17 The
seller could avoid liability for breach of warranty by proving that the plain-
tiff was not in privity of contract 18 or failed to give the seller notice of a
defect in the product within the statutory period, 19 or by proving that the
seller's liability was limited through a valid disclaimer.
20
In an effort to alleviate these problems, courts and legislatures devel-
oped the doctrine of strict liability in tort, which imposes liability on the
15. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 343.
16. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1978). Section 2-715(2) provides for the recovery of
"[c]onsequential damages resulting from the seller's breach includ[ing] . . . injury to
person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty." Id
17. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 655-56. "[Ilt gradually became apparent
that 'warranty'. . . carries far too much luggage in the way of undesirable complica-
tions, and is more trouble than it is worth." Id at 656. For a discussion of the
obstacles to recovery presented by privity, notice requirements, and disclaimers, see
Note, Products Liabih'ty." Tort or Contract-A Resolution of the Con fl1t?, 21 N.Y.L.F. 587
(1976).
18. In any breach of warranty action there are two possible privity issues: hori-
zontal privity and vertical privity. Vertical privity determines how far up the chain
of distribution an injured purchaser may reach for recovery-"who can be sued." See
Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liability. A Claricatzon of the Search for a Clear and Under-
standable Rule, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 391, 394-95 (1972). Horizontal privity classifies
those parties that may bring suit-"who can sue." Id at 395-96. The U.C.C. is silent
on the issue of vertical privity but does suggest three alternatives on the issue of
horizontal privity, leaving the states free to select one. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978).
Alternative A extends seller's warranty to the purchaser's family, household and
guests. Id Alternative A. Alternative B extends the warranty to any naturalperson
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods. Id Alternative B. Alternative
C extends a seller's warranty to any person reasonably expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods. Id. Alternative C. Although these categories may be expanded
judicially, many states retain the defense of lack of privity as a bar to recovery under
the U.C.C. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 399-405. Penn-
sylvania adopted Alternative A but judicially expanded its application. See 13 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2318 (1984). For a discussion of the judicial expansion of the
class of beneficiaries to which warranties extend in Pennsylvania, see note 48 infra.
19. See U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (1978). Section 2-607(3) of the U.C.C. provides that a
buyer must give notice to the seller of a breach of warranty within a reasonable time
after discovery of the breach. See id Those beneficiaries who are given rights under
the U.C.C. by virtue of one of the alternative provisions of § 2-318 are required to
notify the seller that an injury has occurred once the injured party becomes aware of
the legal situation. Id comment 5.
20. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978). Under § 2-316(2), a seller may exclude or
modify the implied warranty of merchantability if the disclaiming language is con-
spicuous and mentions the word merchantability. See id.
1198 [Vol. 29: p. 1195
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manufacturer or supplier of defective goods without proof of fault. 2' The
development of the doctrine of strict liability culminated in the enactment of
section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. 22 In order to recover
21. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 655-56. Warranty theory under the
U.C.C. was designed to protect the expectations of the contracting parties. Wade, Is
Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconsti-
tutionaL, 42 TENN. L. REv. 123, 127 (1974). Strict product liability, however, is based
on the social policy of protecting consumers from harm. W. PROSSER, supra note 11,
at 613.
The doctrine of strict liability in tort emerged in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Strict liability
relieves the injured plaintiff of the difficult, if not impossible, burden of proving the
negligence of the manufacturer. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for rod-
ucts, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973). There are two principal policy reasons behind the
adoption of strict liability: shifting of loss from the injured consumer to the manufac-
turer who is better able to absorb that loss, and giving the manufacturer greater
incentive to prevent the release of defective products into the consumer market. Id
at 826.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A pro-
vides as follows:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
The following states have judicially adopted section 402A: Alabama, Atkins v.
American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); Arizona, O.S. Stapley Co. v.
Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Colorado, Bradford v. Bendix-Westing-
house Auto. Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1974); Connecticut,
Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84 (1970); Florida, West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Hawaii, Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp.,
52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Idaho, Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho
674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Indiana, Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147
Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970); Iowa, Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Kansas, Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545
P.2d 1104 (1976); Kentucky, Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d
441 (Ky. 1965); Maryland, Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d
955 (1976); Mississippi, State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Missouri, Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445
S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Montana, Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A.,
Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); New Hampshire, Buttrick v. Arthur Les-
sard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); New Mexico, Stang v. Hertz
Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); North Dakota, Johnson v. American Mo-
tors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); Oklahoma, Kirkland v. General Motors
Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Oregon, Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467,
435 P.2d 806 (1967); Pennsylvania, Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d853 (1966);
11991983-84]
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under section 402A, the plaintiff must prove only that (1) the plaintiff's in-
jury was attributable to a dangerous condition of a product supplied by the
defendant, (2) the defective condition proximately caused plaintiff's injuries,
and (3) the defective condition existed at the time the product left the posses-
sion of the defendant.2 3 Thus, under the strict products liability action, the
plaintiff was relieved of the problems associated with privity, disclaimer, and
notice of defect and, as a result, strict liability became the favored theory of
recovery.
24
One of the most significant distinctions between implied warranty and
strict liability is the length of their statutes of limitations. 25 Under the
Rhode Island, Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971);
South Dakota, Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973);
Texas, Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Utah, Ernest W.
Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979); Vermont, Zaleskie v.
Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110 (1975); Washington, Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75
Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969); Wisconsin, Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55 (1967).
Maine has adopted section 402A by statute. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 221 (1980). Arkansas has also enacted a statute that incorporates the language of
section 402A. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.2 (1983 Supp.).
The following states, although not adopting 402A per se, have adopted some
theory of recovery equivalent to strict product liability: Alaska, Bachner v. Pearson,
479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); California, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Delaware, Martin v. Ryder Truck
Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976); Illinois, Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 11. 2d
612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Louisiana, Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La.
599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971); Michigan, Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich.
85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Minnesota, Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115,
169 N.W.2d 587 (1969); Nebraska, Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191
N.W.2d 601 (1971); Nevada, Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135
(1970); New Jersey, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965); New York, Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461 (1973); Ohio, Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d
185 (1966); Tennessee, Ford Motor Co. v. London, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240
(1966); West Virginia, Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W.
Va. 1979).
In addition, Georgia provides for strict liability for manufacturers in the sale of
personal property. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11 (b)(1) (1982). For a survey of the
status of products liability law in various states, see Comment, Comparative Negligence
and Strict Products Liabity." Where Do We Stand. Where Do We Go.', 29 VuIl. L. REV.
695 (1984).
23. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 712-13 (W. Keeton 5th ed.
1984).
24. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 656-58.
25. Compare U.C.C. § 2-725(a) (1978) (four-year limitations period) with 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524(2) (Purdon 1974) (two-year limitations period). One of
the earliest purposes of statutes of limitations was the avoidance of law suits. 21 Jac.
I, ch. 16 (1623). Statutes of limitations serve both evidentiary and social purposes.
They compel a litigant to enforce a claim while the evidence is still fresh, and ensure
individuals that a long-unsettled claim will not suddenly and unexpectedly be suc-
cessfully instituted. See Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 1177, 1185 (1950) [hereafter cited as Developments in the Law]. Statutes of limita-
tions prevent "the unexpected enforcement of stale claims after evidence has been
lost or destroyed, witnesses have disappeared or died, or memories have faded."
1200
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U.C.C., an action must be commenced within four years from the date of the
accrual of the cause of action. 26 Generally, the cause of action accrues at the
time tender of delivery is made.2 7 In contrast, actions brought under state
strict liability and negligence law typically must be filed within two years or
less of the date of accrual. 28 Usually, these tort statutes run from the date of
injury or the date the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the in-
jury.29 Due to the radical differences between these two statutes of limita-
tions, a contrariety of judicial opinion has evolved over whether the U.C.C.
or tort statute of limitations should apply to breach of warranty actions in-
volving personal injury.30
Note, Statute of Lmitations: Tihnefor Reform in Oklahoma, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 178 (1980)
(citing Developments in the Law, supra, at 1185). Finally, these statutes are evidence of
the legislative policy which may favor or disfavor certain types of actions. Develop-
ments in the Law, supra, at 1185-86.
26. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978). "An action for breach of any contract for sale
must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the
original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitations to not less than
one year but may not extend it." Id
27. See id § 2-725(2). Section 2-725(2) provides as follows:
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty oc-
curs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty
explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the
breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues
when the breach is or should have been discovered.
Id.
28. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (1982) (two years); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (two years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West
1952) (two years); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524(2) (Purdon 1984) (two years).
29. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 655-56.
30. The following courts have held that the statute of limitations provided by
the U.C.C. governs: Reid v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 512 F.2d 1294 (6th Cir. 1975)
(applying Michigan Law); Teel v. American Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.
Mo. 1981) (applying Kentucky law); Maly v. Magnavox Co., 460 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.
Miss. 1978) (applying Mississippi law); Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F.
Supp. 976 (D. Alaska 1973) (applying Alaska law); Wright v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc.,
358 So. 2d 444 (Ala. 1978); Johnson v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154 (Del.
1980); Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 III. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974); Redfield v.
Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973); Layman v. Keller Ladders,
Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594 (1970); Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610
S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980).
The following courts have held that the U.C.C. statute of limitations governs
only where there is a buyer-seller relationship between the parties: Becker v. Volk-
swagen of Am., Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 794, 125 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1975); Plouffe v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 118 R.I. 288, 373 A.2d 492 (1977).
The following courts have applied the state personal injury statute of limita-
tions: Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 486 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying West
Virginia law); Tyler v. R.R. Street & Co., 322 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1971) (apply-
ing Virginia law); Abate v. Barkers of Wallingford, Inc., 27 Conn. Supp. 46, 229 A.2d
366 (1967); Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 395 Mich. 271, 235 N.W.2d 570 (1975) (ap-
plying Ohio law); Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d
275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353
(Okla. 1974).
For a general discussion of courts' adoption and treatment of different statutes of
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One line of cases has held that the tort statute of limitations applies to
all breach of warranty actions for personal injury on the ground that, re-
gardless of the form of the action, the essence of the action is tortious in
nature.3' Other courts have reached the same conclusion reasoning that the
U.C.C. statute of limitations was not designed to cover products liability
cases but, rather, was intended to govern only those actions arising in com-
mercial settings. 32 Still other courts have stated that it is the nature of the
limitations see Murray, Products Liability--Another Word, 35 U. Prrr. L. REV. 255, 260-
70 (1973); [hereinafter cited as Murray, Products Liability] (U.C.C. statute of limita-
tions should not apply to personal injury actions); Murray, supra note 18, at 416-28
(U.C.C. statute of limitations intended for commercial transactions); Murray, Random
Thoughts on Mendel, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 86 (1970) (tort statute of limitations should
apply to personal injury actions caused by defective products); Stevenson, Products
Liability and the Virginia Statute of Limitations-A Callfor the Legisative Rescue Squad, 16
U. RICH. L. REV. 323 (1982) (U.C.C. time of delivery not feasible for disease related
products liability); Note, When the Product Ticks: Products Liability and Statutes of Limitla-
tions, 11 IND. L. REV. 693 (1978) (statutes of limitations needed to avoid indefinite
liability for manufacturers of long-lived products); Note, supra note 17, at 605-10
(U.C.C. statute of limitations intended for commercial transactions only); Note, supra
note 25 (a single statute of limitations for defective products is necessary); Case Com-
ment, U. C C--Statute of Limitations- Conflict Between Personal Injury and Sales Contract
Statutes of Limitations, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 201 (1972) (personal injury actions arising
from contracts of sale are still tort actions).
31. See, e.g., Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). In
Kirkland, the court stated that "[t]he essential nature of an action based upon prod-
ucts liability is an action for injury to personal property or for injury to the rights of
another. The action thus being primarily tortious in nature must be governed by
[the tort statute of limitations] . . . " Id at 1361. The court further noted that the
Restatement itself points out the inapplicability of warranty principles in products
liability by relying on the Restatement comment that "warranty" must be given a
new and different meaning if used in connection with products liability. Id at 1362
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965)). The
court concluded that products liability was an action independent of any contractual
liability and, therefore, the tort statute was applicable rather than that of the U.C.C.
Id at 1361. The court found support for its analysis in the seminal strict tort liability
case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products. "[r]ules defining and governing warranties that
were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot be invoked to
govern manufacturer's liability to those injured by their defective products unless
those rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed." 521 P.2d at
1362 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963)). See also Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 486 F.2d 538 (4th Cir.
1973) (applying West Virginia law) (action was in essence a personal injury action
and statute applicable to personal injuries controlled regardless of the form of the
action); Waldron v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 64 Mich. App. 626, 235 N.W.2d 722
(1975) (breach of warranty action treated as a tort claim to which personal injury
statute of limitations is applicable); Lee v. Wright Tool & Forge Co., 48 Ohio App.
2d 148, 356 N.E.2d 303 (1975) (plaintiff alleged the breach of an implied warranty of
fitness which was treated as an action in tort and controlled by the two-year tort
statute of limitations).
32. See, e.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973). The
Heavner court concluded that the sales chapter of the U.C.C. was inapplicable to per-
sonal injury actions, stating that "[f]undamentally, the chapter is commercially and
contractually oriented." Id at 152, 305 A.2d at 424. The court claimed that the
U.C.C. contemplated actions between two contracting parties, not those between a
seller and a consumer injured by a defective product. Id at 152-53, 305 A.2d at 424-
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wrong alleged that should control. Therefore, these courts have held that
the state statute of limitations governing action for personal injuries applies
whenever suit is brought for the recovery of damages for personal injuries. 33
In contrast, another line of cases has held that the statute of limitations
provided by the U.C.C. governs warranty actions for personal injuries on the
ground that the U.C.C. provides a remedy separate and distinct from strict
tort liability.3 4 These courts embraced the sales statute of limitations in
breach of warranty cases by relying on the implied warranty's genesis in the
contract of sale context.3 5 Alternatively, these courts reasoned that the
U.C.C. explicitly provided for the recovery of personal injuries; thus, they
determined that the U.C.C. statute of limitations governs actions brought
under the U.C.C. without regard to any previous classifications of such ac-
tions as tort or contract.3 6 In further support of their position, these courts
have explained that in adhering to the four-year statute of limitations, they
further the U.C.C.'s underlying purpose of making the law among various
jurisdictions uniform. 37
25. See also Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 395 Mich. 271, 235 N.W.2d 570 (1975)
(U.C.C. statute of limitations satisfactory in commercial setting but inconsistent with
principles developed with respect to actions against manufacturers for personal in-
jury).
The inapplicability of the U.C.C. in products liability cases is dealt with exten-
sively in Murray, Products Liabi/ity, supra note 30.
33. See, e.g., Tyler v. R.R. Street & Co., 322 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1971) (ap-
plying Virginia law). The Tyer court held that the state two-year tort statute of
limitations applied to every action for personal injuries. Id See also Hanson v. Amer-
ican Motors Corp., 83 Mich. App. 553, 269 N.W.2d 222 (1978) (statute of limitations
governing personal injuries applied in actions where the injury is to the person).
34. See, e.g., Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 11. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974)
(U.C.C. is a statutory cause of action for recovery for injuries from defective products
distinct and in addition to strict tort liability); Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610
S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980) (U.C.C. establishes an alternative remedy for injuries caused
by defective products).
35. See, e.g., Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509 (Ala. 1979) (breach of
warranty statute of limitations applicable since such actions are ex contractu); John-
son v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154 (Del. 1980) (U.C.C. statute applies since
statutory remedy should be governed by the period of limitation provided by the
statute creating the remedy); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 276-77,
512 P.2d 776, 778 (1973) (court will not look outside the provisions of the U.C.C.);
Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594 (1970) (breach of
warranty action arises out of contract for sale and U.CC. sales contract statute of
limitations governs the action).
36. Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 277, 512 P.2d 776, 778
(1973). The court in Red fie/dstated that where the legislature has provided a statu-
tory remedy, whether that action was in tort or contract at common law is irrelevant.
Id. The court found that the specific limitation provided in the U.C.C. was applica-
ble under the language of the Code and declined to look outside the provision of the
U.C.C. for more precise definitions. Id
See also Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980) (tradi-
tional tort/contract distinctions were irrelevant since the U.C.C. provides a statutory
remedy).
37. Morton v. Texas Welding & Mfg. Co., 408 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Tex. 1976)
(U.C.C. liberally construed to simplify, clarify, and make uniform the law governing
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Still a third line of cases has held that the U.C.C. statute of limitations
is applicable only where there is privity of contract between the plaintiff and
defendant. 38 Although the individual state may have eliminated the re-
quirement of privity in breach of warranty actions, these courts have re-
established the privity requirement for the purposes of deciding which stat-
ute of limitations applies. 39 Essentially, these courts have interpreted the
U.C.C. statute of limitations literally, reasoning that because the statute was
designed to cover actions for breach of sales contracts, it is inapplicable
where there is no contractual buyer-seller relationship between the
litigants.
40
commercial transactions including the elimination of jurisdictional variations in stat-
utes of limitations).
See also Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
The court in Gardiner literally interpreted § 2-725 in adopting the four-year statute of
limitations. Id. at 418, 197 A.2d at 613. The court was motivated by the need for
uniformity in the law and the liberal construction of the code called for in § 1-102 of
the Code. Id at 419, 197 A.2d at 613.
Section 1-102 of the U.C.C. provides:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its under-
lying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
U.C.C. § 1-102 (1978).
38. This was the view adopted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Williams
v. West Penn Power Co., 313 Pa. Super. 461, 460 A.2d 278, ajd z part, rev'd in7 part,
502 Pa. 557, 467 A.2d 811 (1983). See also International Union of Operating Eng'rs v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 106 R.I. 248, 258 A.2d 271 (1969) (U.C.C. statute of limita-
tions inapplicable because the plaintiff was not a buyer and the manufacturer was
not a seller to which the implied warranty of merchantability applied). Some courts
also include an additional limited class of beneficiaries provided by the states' version
of the U.C.C. while continuing to disallow recovery to other consumers under the
U.C.C. statute of limitations if they lack a contractual relationship with the defend-
ant. See, e.g., Becker v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 794, 125 Cal. Rptr.
326 (1975) (U.C.C. not intended to apply to personal injury action except where the
suit was between a buyer, or a limited class of beneficiaries, and the immediate seller,
and even then, only on the basis of a warranty in the commercial sales sense);
Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973) (sales chapter of the
U.C.C. inapplicable to warranty actions for personal injuries where there was a direct
buyer or a limited class of beneficiaries).
39. See, e.g., Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 110 R.I. 83, 290 A.2d 607 (1972). In Kelly,
the plaintiffs were not required to be in privity of contract with the manufacturer in
order to bring a cause of action alleging breach of warranty. Id at 87-88, 290 A.2d at
610. However, the court held that the U.C.C. statute of limitations did not govern
actions by third-party beneficiaries because they lacked a contractual relationship
with the defendant, thus barring the plaintiffs' action because it was brought after
the statute of limitations applicable to personal injuries had run. Id at 88, 290 A.2d
at 610.
40. See, e.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Inter-
national Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 106 R.I. 248, 258 A.2d
271 (1969). In support of the proposition that the U.C.C. statute applies in a breach
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Over the course of the past twenty-five years, Pennsylvania has adhered
to a number of these approaches, Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt
the U.C.C.; it became effective in 1954 replete with the four-year statute of
limitations. 4' In 1966, Pennsylvania courts adopted strict tort liability in the
form of section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts.42 Strict tort liabil-
ity actions are governed by Pennsylvania's two-year personal injury statute
of limitations. 43 Thus, under Pennsylvania law, a person injured by a defec-
tive product theoretically could bring a cause of action to recover damages
for personal injuries under either the U.C.C. or section 402A. 44
However, the outcome of the suit could differ depending upon the form
of action selected. For example, after the adoption of section 402A in Penn-
sylvania, a person injured by a defective product could have brought a strict
products liability action against the direct seller or the manufacturer without
a showing of privity of contract with the defendant. 45 However, if the same
individual brought a breach of warranty action in contract under the
U.C.C., the plaintiff's cause of action would have failed automatically where
there was no proof of privity between the plaintiff and defendant. 46 To
eliminate this disparity, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the re-
quirement of privity in connection with claims brought under the U.C.C.
4 7
By this action, the court aspired to achieve legal symmetry between the two
causes of action so that identical controversies would not be decided differ-
ently solely because one was labelled products liability and the other breach
of warranty.
48
of warranty case between parties in privity of contract and not in a similar action
brought by a third-party beneficiary, the court in Reavner relied on the Official Com-
ment to § 2-725 which is commercially oriented and specifically states that the
U.C.C. "takes sales contracts out of the general laws limiting the time for commencing
contractual actions and selects a four year period as the most appropriate to modern
practice." Heavner, 63 N.J. at 156, 305 A.2d at 426 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-725 Official
Comment (1978)).
41. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101-9507 (Purdon 1984). The U.C.C. became
effective in Pennsylvania on July 1, 1954. 1 U.L.A. 1 (1984 Supp.).
42. SeeWebb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). For the text of§ 402A,
see note 22, supra.
43. The Pennsylvania personal injury statute of limitations provides: "The fol-
lowing actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years: . . . (2) An
action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual
caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another."
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524(2) (Purdon 1981).
44. For a discussion of these two causes of actions as theories of liability for the
recovery of injury caused by defective products, see notes 11-24 and accompanying
text supra.
45. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 427, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (1966).
46. See, e.g., Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 392, 221 A.2d 320, 325 (1966) (de-
ceased nephew of buyer not within benefits of any implied warranty made by remote
seller of defective product since he was not a purchaser of the product).
47. See Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974)
(horizontal privity); Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968) (verti-
cal privity).
48. In Kassab, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the concept of vertical
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In addition to abolishing the privity requirement in breach of warranty
actions, Pennsylvania courts have also struggled with the issue of whether
the two-year personal injury or the four-year commercial statute of limita-
tions should apply. In Gardner v. Philadelphia Gas Works,49 the plaintiffs, as
direct purchasers, brought an action for breach of implied warranty against
their immediate seller to recover for personal injuries sustained two years
and eight days earlier. 50 Recognizing that a claim for breach of warranty is
privity, thereby allowing purchasers injured by defective goods to sue remote manu-
facturers for breach of implied warranty. Kassab, 432 Pa. at 234, 246 A.2d at 856. In
that case, a couple that raised breed cattle sued the manufacturer of a food supple-
ment and the seller of food that injured their cattle. Id at 220-21, 246 A.2d at 850.
The plaintiffs alleged that the food contained a synthetic hormone that caused their
pregnant cows to abort and their breed bull to "behav[e] in a manner which tended
to cast doubt upon his masculinity." Id at 220, 246 A.2d at 849. Eventually, the bull
was pronounced sterile. Id.
The Kassab court concluded that since Pennsylvania had adopted § 402A, which
contained no privity requirements, "the same demands of legal symmetry which once
supported privity now destroy it." Id at 229, 246 A.2d at 853. The court did not
want identical controversies to be decided differently solely because one was framed
as a contract action and the other a tort action, stating that "[t]o permit the result of
a lawsuit to depend solely on the caption atop plaintiff's complaint is not now, and
has never been, a sound resolution of identical controversies." Id. The supreme court
claimed that recovery under the Code had to be co-extensive with that under § 402A
in the area of products liability, reasoning that the same policy considerations behind
the imposition of strict liability in tort mandated the abolition of privity in contract
actions for breach of warranty. Id at 230-31, 246 A.2d at 854. These policy consider-
ations are "the consumer's inability to protect himself adequately from defectively
manufactured goods . . .; the implied assurance on the part of the seller that his
goods are safe...; [and] the superior risk bearing ability of the manufacturer ....
Id at n.6 (citations omitted).
Six years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished horizontal privity in
warranty actions. See Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co. (Salvador I), 457 Pa. 24,
32-33, 319 A.2d 903, 907-08 (1974). In Salvador I, an employee of a company that
purchased a steam boiler brought an action for breach of warranty against the buyer,
seller and manufacturer of the boiler for injuries sustained when the boiler exploded.
Id. at 26, 319 A.2d at 904. A standing problem arose because the employee did not fit
into the limited class of third party beneficiaries that were provided for in the version
of§ 2-318 of the U.C.C. adopted by the Pennsylvania legislature. Id. at 27, 319 A.2d
at 905. See 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2318 (1984) (adopting Alternative A of § 2-
318 of the U.C.C.). The scope of the seller's liability in Pennsylvania was as follows:
The warranty of a seller whether express of implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his
home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the war-
ranty ....
13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2318 (1984).
Finding that by virtue of § 402A a manufacturer was virtually the guarantor of
his product's safety, the court reasoned that it would be unjust to allow a plaintiff to
recover when the complaint was in trespass (tort) but be denied relief on identical
facts if the complaint was in assumpsit (contract). 457 Pa. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907.
Referring to the Kassab decision, the court stated that this anomalous situation is
certainly to be avoided. Id
49. 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
50. Id at 416, 197 A.2d at 612. The Gardiners sustained injuries when gas es-
caped from an underground conduit maintained by defendants. Id
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a separate and distinct claim from a personal injury action based on negli-
gence, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the four-year statute of
limitations provided by the U.C.C.
5
'
In 1978, however, in Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co. (Salvador Il),52 the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania distinguished Gardiner and held that the two-
year tort statute of limitations applied to breach of warranty actions for per-
sonal injuries brought by third parties.53 The court first noted that Penn-
sylvania had abolished the requirement of privity under the U.C.C. in order
to permit third parties to bring actions against remote defendants in war-
ranty, as well as in strict products liability. 54 The court then focused on the
primary reason for this change-the desire to achieve legal symmetry be-
tween the two causes of action-and determined that in order to better fur-
ther this goal, the two-year personal injury statute of limitations should
apply to actions by third parties for personal injuries under the U.C.C. 55
Noting that the extension of the breach of warranty action to third party
51. Id. at 419, 197 A.2d at 614. The Gardiner court was also motivated by an
underlying purpose of the U.C.C.: to make the law among various jurisdictions uni-
form. Id., 197 A.2d at 613. Gardiner was decided prior to the adoption of strict tort
liability by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220
A.2d 853 (1966).
After Gardiner, federal courts applying Pennsylvania law also applied the four-
year statute of limitations provided by the U.C.C. See, e.g., Patterson v. Her Majesty
Indus., 450 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (adoption of§ 402A did not preclude use of
U.C.C. statute of limitations in breach of implied warranty action alleging personal
injury); Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 339 F. Supp. 1385 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (four-year
statute governed personal injury action based upon breach of warranty); Hoeflich v.
Williams S. Merrell Co., 288 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (four-year statute applica-
ble to breach of warranty action alleging personal injury); Natale v. Upjohn Co., 236
F. Supp. 37 (D. Del. 1964) (U.C.C. applied regardless of whether the damages were
for personal injury or not), aft'd, 356 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1966).
52. 256 Pa. Super. 330, 389 A.2d 1148 (1978), af'dper curiam, 492 Pa. 258, 424
A.2d 497 (1981).
53. Id at 344, 389 A.2d at 1156. Mr. Salvador, an employee of United Machine
& Tool Co., suffered loss of hearing when a boiler exploded where he was working.
Id at 333, 389 A.2d at 1150. The boiler was installed in 1962. Salvador was injured
in 1967 and brought suit in 1971. Id at 332-33, 389 A.2d at 1150. The case had
reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the issue of horizontal privity. Id at
332, 389 A.2d at 1149. The court abolished horizontal privity (Salvador I) and re-
manded the case. Id, 389 A.2d at 1150. See Salvador , 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903
(1974). For a discussion of the abolition of horizontal privity in Pennsylvania, see
notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra. The second appeal to the supreme court
involved the issue of the proper statute of limitations. See Salvador 1, 256 Pa. Super.
at 332, 389 A.2d at 1150.
The superior court, in Salvador II, distinguished Garditer by noting that the Gar-
diners were direct purchasers in privity of contract with the seller, rather than third
party beneficiaries. d at 337-38, 389 A.2d at 1152-53. The court also relied on the
fact that Gardiner was decided before strict products liability had been adopted in
Pennsylvania. Id
54. 256 Pa. Super. at 336-37, 389 A.2d at 1150-52. For a discussion of the aboli-
tion of privity in Pennsylvania and the reasons therefor, see notes 45-48 and accom-
panying text supra.
55. 256 Pa. Super. at 337, 389 A.2d at 1152.
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plaintiffs suing for personal injuries was entirely the creation of the judiciary,
the Salvador 1I court concluded that it was free to determine which statute of
limitations should apply to the resultant cause of action.56 Furthermore, the
court found that the U.C.C. statute of limitations was never intended to
apply to third-party claims for personal injuries but only to claims by the
contracting parties and, therefore, the statute of limitations for strict prod-
ucts liability actions would govern.
57
Finally, in Hahn v. Allanic Rz'chfield Co.,58 the Third Circuit, interpreting
Pennsylvania law, applied the two-year statute of limitations in a breach of
warranty suit brought by a third party.59 Initially, the court noted that im-
plied warranty was merely a transparent device to impose strict liability.
60
With the abolition of privity this had become even more apparent because
warranty liability, as with strict products liability, was thus imposed by law,
not contractual agreement. 6 1 The court further found that implied war-
56. Id. at 341, 389 A.2d at 1154. Claiming that strict liability recovery under a
contract theory such as implied warranty was a pure fiction created to reach a desira-
ble social policy, the court found that the theory of recovery was one sounding in tort.
Id at 341-42, 389 A.2d at 1154 (citing Murray, Products Liabiity, supra note 30, at
267).
57. Id at 341, 389 A.2d at 1154. The court claimed that it would take a very
strained reading of the U.C.C. statute of limitations to conclude that it applied to
anyone other than the contracting parties in a breach of warranty action. Id (citing
Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 403, 335 N.E.2d 275, 280, 373
N.Y.S.2d 39, 45 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring)). The court reached this conclu-
sion by noting that the entire section was entitled "Statute of Limitations in Con-
tracts for Sale" and was directed to commercial transactions. Id at 341-42, 389 A.2d
at 1154. Noting that in warranty actions breach occurs at tender of delivery, the
court recognized that an injured party could be completely unaware of any breach
until after the statute of limitations had run, leaving the injured party with no rem-
edy under the U.C.C. at the time of injury. Id at 342, 389 A.2d at 1155. The court
reasoned that this anomaly underscored the notion that the U.C.C. statute of limita-
tions was not intended to apply to third party personal injury actions. Id The court
then applied the two-year personal injury statute of limitations as "the only sensible
accomodation between the two theories of liability, contract and tort, if legal symme-
try is to be achieved." Id. at 343, 389 A.2d at 1155.
58. 625 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. dented, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
59. Id at 1100. In Hahn, the plaintiff-employee was severely injured when a
600-pound pipe suspended overhead by a one-ton chain hoist fell on him. .d at 1097.
Although the court applied Pennsylvania law with regard to the statute of limita-
tions, the court decided the case on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that the defendant-manufacturer had sold the defective hoist to the plaintiff's
employer-a necessary element for recovery under a breach of warranty theory. Id
at 1097.
The court detailed the cases eliminating the privity requirement in Penn-
sylvania, and noted the effort by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to make recovery
for nonpurchaser claimants under the U.C.C. co-extensive with recovery under
§ 402A. Id. at 1103. For a discussion of the elimination of the privity requirement in
Pennsylvania, see notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
60. 625 F.2d at 1103 (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment m (1965)).
61. Id (citing Prosser, TheFallofthe Cztadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 802 (1966)).
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ranty liability was tortious in nature, like strict liability, because it was based
upon the same tort-based policy considerations of protecting the plaintiff
from unreasonable risks of injury, as opposed to the contract consideration of
protecting the plaintiffs expectation interests.62  Having erected this
tort/contract dichotomy, the court concluded that because Pennsylvania
had been moving continuously in the direction of treating implied warranty
actions as strict liability actions, the two-year personal injury statute of limi-
tations should apply. 63 The Hahn court buttressed this conclusion through
an analysis of the inapplicability of the U.C.C. statute of limitations in any
personal injury actions brought by non-purchasers. 6 4
Against this background, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Williams
v. West Penn Power Co., began its analysis of whether the Pennsylvania two-
year personal injury statute of limitations or the four-year commercial stat-
ute of limitations governed warranty actions for personal injury brought
under the U.C.C. 65 Initially, the Williams court examined the development
62. 625 F.2d at 1103-04. According to the Hahn court, tort law is designed to
further an important social policy of protecting persons from unreasonable risks of
injury. Id. Further, the court claimed that the goal of tort law is to place the injured
party in the same position after the injury as before the injury. Id. at 1104. Contract
law, on the other hand, protects the expectations of the contracting parties expressed
by voluntary agreement. Id The Third Circuit stated that contract law is designed
to protect only the contracting parties, and the goal is to give the nonbreaching party
the benefit of the bargain by putting him in the position occupied before the breach.
Id
63. Id Reasoning that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended liability to
third parties based solely on the social policy of protecting the interest in freedom
from injury to the person, and not based on the contractual intent of the parties, the
Hahn court applied the personal injury statute of limitations. Id
64. Id at 1104-05. In its analysis, the Hahn court relied on the commercial na-
ture and intent of the U.C.C., quoting Dean Murray extensively. Id (quoting Mur-
ray, Products Liabiity, supra note 30, at 267). The court stated that § 2-725 should not
apply to non-purchaser breach of warranty actions based upon a literal reading of
the section. Id The section is entitled "Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale"
and is directed towards a buyer/seller relationship. Id Breach occurs and the statute
begins to run when tender of delivery is made: since delivery is made only to the
buyer, the court reasoned that the only relevant parties seem to be the buyer and
seller. Id. As further support for the contractual nature of § 2-725, the court quoted
Dean Murray's notation that the comment to the statute states: "This article takes
sales contracts out of the general laws limiting the time for commencing contractual ac-
tions and selects a four-year period as the most appropriate to modern business prac-
tice." Id. at 1105 (quoting Murray, Products Liabiity, supra note 30, at 267 (quoting
U.C.C. § 2-725 Official Comment (1978) (emphasis supplied by Dean Murray))).
The court also noted that recovery by nonpurchasers would be completely acci-
dental under the U.C.C. statute of limitations, since it would begin to run on the date
of tender of delivery. -d. Referring again to Dean Murray's analysis, the court stated
that adhering to the U.C.C. statute of limitations could result, in some cases, in a
nonpurchaser being barred from bringing an action before he or she has sustained an
injury. Id. (citing Murray, supra note 30, at 270). Thus, the purchaser's ability to
recover would depend upon the accidental event of how close in time to delivery the
person was injured. Id
65. 502 Pa. at 560, 467 A.2d at 812. As a preliminary matter, the court an-
nounced that the trespass actions were time-barred; thus the court dealt only with the
15
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of warranty law in Pennsylvania. 66 First, the court explained that Penn-
sylvania had abolished privity in warranty actions because of the unfairness,
under present marketing practices, of insulating the manufacturer of a defec-
tive product from liability to an injured nonbuyer consumer. 67 Noting that
warranties could arise without the parties' intent to make a contract,
Pennsylvania courts had reasoned that warranties could exist between par-
ties who had not dealt with one another.68 Moreover, the Williams court
explained that the privity requirement was condemned in Pennsylvania be-
cause of the belief that, in the context of nonpurchaser actions, the U.C.C.
should be co-extensive with 402A.6 9 Finally, the Williams court stated that
assumpsit portion of the complaint that alleged a breach of warranty by the manu-
facturer and the retail seller of the ladder. Id. at 563, 467 A.2d at 814.
66. Id at 565-66, 467 A.2d at 815. The court detailed the history of the action
for breach of warranty, noting its development as a contract action replete with the
requirements of an agreement and privity. Id at 563, 467 A.2d at 814. The court
explained that breach of warranty was originally a tort concept arising from the
warrantor's consent to be bound. Id. The requirement of consent was later elimi-
nated. Id However, because the action involved an undertaking and the existence of
a warranty, the action was deemed as sounding in contract. Id As the contractual
nature of warranty became more pronounced, lack of privity between the plaintiff
and defendant developed as a defense. Id at 563-64, 467 A.2d at 814. Privity was
defined as "[t]hat connection or relationship which exists between two or more con-
tracting parties." Id at n. 11.
According to the court, the requirement of privity was clearly established in
Pennsylvania when the U.C.C. was adopted and, although the U.C.C. extended
causes of action for breach of warranty to members of the buyer's family, household
or a guest in the purchaser's home, the Pennsylvania courts continued to require
privity as to employees of the purchaser. Id at 564, 467 A.2d at 814-15 (citing Hoch-
gertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963)).
67. Id at 564-65, 467 A.2d at 815. The court targeted the seminal case of Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., as having triggered the fall of privity in products
liability cases. Id at 565, 467 A.2d at 815 (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)). The Williams court noted that Henningsen
abolished horizontal privity and extended the implied warranty to the ultimate pur-
chaser on the grounds that it was a necessary response to modern marketing condi-
tions. Id. The supreme court then explained that after Pennsylvania's adoption of
strict liability for defective products, it was a logical step for privity to fall in breach
of warranty cases. Id
For a discussion of the fall of privity in Pennsylvania warranty cases, see notes
45-48 and accompanying text supra.
68. 502 Pa. at 567, 467 A.2d at 816. The Wilhams court noted that Salvador I
recognized that the abolition of privity made the manufacturer essentially a guaran-
tor of his product, a result commended by the court. Id. (citing Salvador I, 457 Pa. at
32-33, 319 A.2d at 907-08 (1974)). The SalvadorIcourt would not allow the fact that
the purchaser had no contractual relationship with the manufacturer to defeat the
claim. Id
69. Id at 566, 467 A.2d at 815. The court stated that "[t]o retain this tort-
contract dichotomy with its haphazard, crazy quilt of exceptions and appendages
can only cause. . . '[I]egal confusion. . . . Aggrieved plaintiffs have scarcely known
whether to sue in deceit or fraud or for negligence or breach of warranty-or indeed
whether it was worthwhile to sue at all.' " Id. at 566, 467 A.2d at 815-16 (quoting
Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 234-35, 246 A.2d 848, 856 (1968) (quoting
Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 129, 90
N.W.2d 873, 878 (1958))). The Williams court noted that although the causes of
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Pennsylvania courts had also been motivated by a desire not to allow a non-
purchaser to be denied recovery under warranty theory because of privity
requirements when, under the identical factual situation, that nonpurchaser
could recover in tort under section 402A. 70 The Williams court recognized
that, to avoid this anamoly, Pennsylvania courts would not allow the form of
action to control and would instead seek to achieve a degree of legal symme-
try between actions under the U.C.C. and section 402A.71
However, the Wlliams court then found that "Pennsylvania was not to
enjoy a respite after the successful siege on the citadel of privity" because the
dispute over the appropriate statute of limitations "resuscitate[d] the ghost
of privity. ' ' 72 In an effort to avoid this result, the court determined that the
Salvador II court had erred when it resurrected a tort/contract dichotomy in
warranty actions and applied the two-year personal injury statute of limita-
tions to third-party plaintiffs. 73 The Williams court found that, instead of
creating legal symmetry, the Salvador II court had created legal asymmetry
by treating direct purchasers differently from all other consumers in war-
ranty actions even though both groups of individuals had received their inju-
ries in the same accident. 74 In light of Pennsylvania case law criticizing the
use of privity and the lack of legal symmtery that would result if Salvador II
were followed, the court expressly declared its disapproval of the holding in
Salvador /.75
According to the Williams court, this tort/contract dichotomy failed to
action under the U.C.C. and § 402A were co-extensive, they were not identical. Id.
n.16, 467 A.2d at 815 n. 16.
70. Id. at 567, 467 A.2d at 816. (citing Salvador , 457 Pa. 24, 32-33, 319 A.2d
902, 907-08 (1974)).
71. Id. at 567-68, 467 A.2d at 816. The court stated that, with the adoption of
strict products liability by Pennsylvania, "the same demands of legal symmetry
which once supported privity now destroy it." Id at 568, 467 A.2d at 816 (quoting
Salvador , 457 Pa. at 32-33, 319 A.2d at 907-08 (quoting Kassab, 432 Pa. at 229, 246
A.2d at 853)).
72. 502 Pa. at 568, 467 A.2d at 817. The court stated that the Salvador Ilcourt
resucitated the privity requirement when it applied the two-year personal injury stat-
ute of limitations to a breach of warranty action brought by a party not in privity of
contract with the defendant. Id. Earlier in the opinion, the Willhams court made it
clear that such a distinction between a direct buyer and injured third parties had
been discredited by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in products liability cases. Id
at 562, 467 A.2d at 813.
73. Id. at 569, 467 A.2d at 817. The Williams court disapproved of the Salvador
1 court's application of a two-year statute of limitations to third-party breach of
warranty actions that alleged personal injury based on the tortious nature of the
complaint. Id. at 569 n.17, 467 A.2d at 817 n.17.
74. Id at 568, 467 A.2d at 817. The Williams court acknowledged that the court
in Salvador 11was motivated by an effort to maintain symmetry between § 402A and
breach of warranty claims under the U.C.C. Id However, the court claimed that
Salvador H created the reverse effect when it selected a statute of limitations for third-
party actions that differed from the statute of limitations that governed actions by
parties in privity of contract. Id
75. Id. at 570, 467 A.2d at 818. The court concluded that to embrace the hold-
ing in Salvador II would "clearly be a disservice to our jurisprudence." Id
1983-84] 1211
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recognize that in the area of products liability "we enter the borderland of
tort and contract. ' 76 Thus, the court found that the mere fact that a war-
ranty claim sought recovery for personal injury did not justify a court's devi-
ating from the U.C.C.'s prescribed statute of limitations in order to choose a
personal injury limitations period.77 Moreover, the court found that there
was "no justification in restoring the concept of privity" since the U.C.C.
itself limited neither recovery nor the availability of its statute of limitations
to direct purchasers. 78 Therefore, the Wilhams court concluded that neither
the concept of privity of contract nor the nature of the breach of warranty
action justified any deviation from the U.C.C. statute of limitations. 79 As a
result, the Wilhams court held that the U.C.C. four-year statute of limita-
tions governed all breach of warranty claims brought under the U.C.C. re-
gardless of whether the claim sought recovery for commercial loss or
personal injuries, and regardless of whether the plaintiff was a direct pur-
chaser or third party.8 0
Analyzing the decision in Wi/h'ams, it is submitted that it is unfortunate
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the U.C.C. four-year statute
of limitations with respect to breach of warranty claims for personal injuries,
regardless of the status of the plaintiff as a third party or a contracting
76. 502 Pa. at 569, 467 A.2d at 817. The court explained: "It is not a question
of whether a claim sounds in tort or assumpsit. Rather it sounds in both." Id. The
court recognized that at least 16 jurisdictions have remedied this problem legisla-
tively by drafting a specific statute of limitations in the field of products liability. Id.
& n.18. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (1984 Supp.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551
(1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2803 (1983 Supp.); CoO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127.5
(1983 Supp.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 95.031 (West 1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403 (1984 Supp.); I.. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, § 13-213 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (West 1983); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 600.5805 (1984 Supp.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05 (West Supp.
1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (1983);
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980). Iowa, the
sixteenth state cited by the court, has a uniform statute of limitations of two years for
all actions founded on personal injuries, "whether based on contract or tort." IowA
CODE ANN. § 614.1 (West Supp. 1984).
77. Id at 569, 467 A.2d at 817.
78. Id. The court stated that the extension of liability under the U.C.C. to per-
sons not in privity with the manufacturer or marketer of a product does not validate
application of a tort statute of limitations. d at 569-70, 467 A.2d at 817. The court
quoted the comment to U.C.C. § 2-318, which provides that
[t]he first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section
in this form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the develop-
ing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who re-
sells, extends to other persons in the distributive chain.
Id at 570, 467 A.2d at 818 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3 (1978)).
79. 502 Pa. at 570, 467 A.2d at 818.
80. Id. The court concluded that injured parties, irrespective of their status as
direct buyer or third party beneficiary, have the option of bringing suit in tort under
the tort statute of limitations, or under the U.C.C. and its corresponding statute of
limitations. Id
1212 [Vol. 29: p. 1195
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1984], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss5/4
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
party."1 In reaching its decision, the Wil'ams court reversed the trend in
Pennsylvania of treating products liability claims brought by nonpurchasers
as subject to the state personal injury statute of limitations and not the stat-
ute provided by the U.C.C.
8 2
Moreover, in Wi'ams, the supreme court expressly stated that its con-
clusion was motivated by a desire to achieve legal symmetry between section
402A and U.C.C. breach of warranty claims, and was also grounded in reli-
ance on the court's previous rejection of any privity requirements in suits by
third parties in order to maintain a cause of action for breach of warranty
under the U.C.C.8 3 However, it is submitted that the court did not achieve
its goal of legal symmetry and that, after the court's holding, the form of the
action will still control over the substance of the complaint. Further, it is
suggested that the court's fear of renewed privity requirements is misplaced.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously espoused the princi-
ple of legal symmetry in order to equate recovery under warranty theory
with recovery under section 402A. 84 After the Wlh'ams decision, the two
81. It is suggested that, given the availability of a cause of action for the recov-
ery of personal injuries under both the U.C.C. and § 402A, courts will continue to
struggle with the issue of the appropriate statute of limitations. The mixed
tort/contract nature of any products liability action lends itself to plausible argu-
ments supporting the adoption of either the personal injury or the U.C.C. statute of
limitations. For a discussion of the case law and pertinent arguments supporting the
adoption of either theory, see notes 31-40 and accompanying text supra.
To resolve the problem created by the differing statutes of limitations, some
states have adopted a single products liability statute of limitations. See note 76 supra.
The Model Uniform Product Liability Act proposes a two-year statute to govern all
products liability claims and specifically preempts the U.C.C. MODEL. UNIFORM
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT §§ 103(A), I 10(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,720, 62,732
(1979).
Many scholars have commented that the U.C.C. provided for the recovery of
personal injuries for defective products in order to allow for the development of strict
products liability under the guise of warranty/contract theory. See, e.g., Murray,
Products Lialbzhy, supra note 30, at 265. This circuitous development of the theory of
products liability was subsequently dwarfed by the specific development of the the-
ory of strict products liability under § 402A. Id. It is submitted that courts will
continue to struggle with the differing statutes of limitations without ever finally
resolving the conflict until the legislature clarifies the action and the applicable stat-
ute of limitations. Perhaps the legislature should eliminate the personal injury recov-
ery for defective products presently permitted by the U.C.C.
82. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania cases that established this trend, see
notes 49-64 and accompanying text supra.
83. 502 Pa. 557, 570, 467 A.2d 811, 818. For a discussion of the Williams court's
desire to achieve legal symmetry between the U.C.C. and § 402A, see notes 69-71 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the court's reliance on the previous
abolition of privity requirements in Pennsylvania, see notes 72 & 75 and accompany-
ing text supra.
84. The adoption of§ 402A permitted third parties to recover in products liabil-
ity suits despite the absence of privity of contract between the third party and the
defendant. For a discussion of the requirements for a cause of action under § 402A,
see note 23 and accompanying text supra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then
abolished privity of contract in breach of warranty cases to establish symmetry be-
tween the two theories of recovery. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Supreme
12131983-84]
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theories of recovery will be symmetrical in the sense that direct purchasers
and third parties will be treated without distinctions based on their status
with respect to the defendant under either theory. However, these parties
may invoke one of two radically different statutes of limitations depending
upon whether they base their claim in warranty or strict liability.85 If the
Williams court was seeking absolute symmetry, it is submitted that it has
failed. Moreover, in doing so, it is suggested that the court ignored an even
more important goal-that of assuring that the substance rather than the
form of the action control so that identical factual situations will not be de-
cided differently simply because one is framed in tort and the other in con-
tract.8 6 Presently an injured third party can merely change the form of the
action and possibly have two more years to bring a cause of action depend-
ing on the date the product was delivered to the buyer.8 7 It is submitted
that this result lends no clarity and uniformity to this troubled area of the
law.
The Williams court also spent a great deal of time detailing the abolition
of privity requirements in actions brought under the U.C.C. and reasons
therefor.8 a It is suggested, however, that the court's reliance on the abolition
of privity as support for the application of the U.C.C. statute of limitations
to direct purchasers and third parties alike is not warranted. Previously, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had discredited privity as a condition prece-
dent to maintenance of a products liability claim couched in breach of war-
Court decisions abolishing the concept of privity, see notes 45-48 and accompanying
text supra. Although Pennsylvania courts strove to make the two theories co-exten-
sive, they are not identical. See 502 Pa. at 566 n.16, 467 A.2d at 815 n.16.
85. After the decision in Williams, an injured plaintiff suing in trespass will be
subject to the two-year personal injury statute of limitations. However, if the same
plaintiff brings the suit under the breach of warranty theory of the U.C.C., a four-
year statute of limitations is applicable. Although the two statutes run from different
dates, it is submitted that this result also leads to legal asymmetry.
86. See Kassab, 421 Pa. at 229, 246 A.2d at 853. "The spirit of Kassab is clear:
the form of action should not control. That is to say, the caption atop the complaint
should not affect the substantive nature of the claim." Murray, Products Liabily,
supra note 30, at 274.
The Salvador Icourt also invoked this rationale to abolish the concept of horizon-
tal privity in breach of warranty actions. For a discussion of Salvador I, see note 48
supra.
87. The U.C.C. statute of limitations extends four years from the date of tender
of delivery of the goods. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1978). If a plaintiff is injured shortly after
the product was delivered to the buyer, that plaintiff may have up to two additional
years to bring a cause of action labelled as a breach of warranty action if the two-year
personal injury statute of limitations has run. It has been suggested that one reason
an injured plaintiff would proceed under the U.C.C. with all of its additional bur-
dens is specifically because the personal injury statute of limitations ran before the
suit was commenced. See Murray, Products Lability, supra note 30, at 257, 260. It is
submitted that there is little else to gain by pursuing the more cumbersome route of a
breach of warranty claim other than additional time to bring suit. For a discussion of
difficulties inherent in suing under warranty theory, see notes 17-20 and accompany-
ing text supra.
88. For a discussion of the Williams court's reliance on the previous abolition of
privity requirements in Pennsylvania, see notes 72 & 75 and accompanying text supra.
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ranty law, reasoning that, with the adoption of section 402A, privity
requirements under the U.C.C. could not remain.8 9 However, it is submit-
ted that the Wilh'ams court never stated why the court's abolition of privity
for the express purpose of permitting an injured third party to bring a cause
of action in warranty compelled the abolition of privity when a court was
considering the appropriateness of a particular statute of limitations. 9°
Rather, given the previous condemnation of privity in order to allow third
parties to bring what were essentially products liability actions under the
U.C.C. and the effort to make such recovery co-extensive with tort recovery,
it is suggested that the better approach would have been to apply the tort
statute of limitations to actions by third parties under the U.C.C. 9 1 As the
89. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had abolished the concept of vertical
privity of contracts in order to permit a purchaser to maintain a cause of action for
breach of warranty against a remote manufacturer. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa.
217, 231, 234, 246 A.2d 848, 854, 856 (1968). Similarly, the court later held that the
absence of horizontal privity of contract could not be raised to defeat an action for
breach of warranty. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d
903, 907 (1974). It is submitted that both decisions addressed the issue of privity of
contract solely in the context of parties eligible to sue and be sued, and not in connec-
tion with a general prohibition of using privity of contract as a requirement in any
form or setting. The Wi'liams court itself speaks of its prior abolition of privity re-
quirements in the context of maintenance of an action. 502 Pa. at 565-66, 467 A.2d
at 815-16.
90. The Williams court correctly stated that the superior court had made distinc-
tions between the direct buyer and third parties for statute of limitations purposes
and not for substantive reasons. 502 Pa. at 561-62, 467 A.2d at 813. Although the
supreme court then went on to discuss the substantive reasons for previously abolish-
ing privity requirements, it is submitted that the court never explained why those
reasons also compelled the abolition of privity when choosing the appropriate statute
of limitations or why the superior court had erred in adopting such a distinction.
The Wiliams court stated that the primary reasons behind the abolition of priv-
ity requirements in Pennsylvania were "the unfairness of insulating the remote man-
ufacturer, who in fact made the defective product, and barring a non-buyer
consumer who is in fact injured by that defect under present marketing practices."
502 Pa. at 565, 467 A.2d at 815. It is suggested that these reasons are inapplicable to
the consideration of the status of the plaintiff in choosing the appropriate statute of
limitations. The parties addressed in those concerns will still be able to maintain the
cause of action and still be capable of being sued. The question becomes, rather,
what is then the appropriate time in which to compel the commencement of such a
suit.
It is suggested that the Williams court should have continued its analysis and
examined the policies behind different statutes of limitations, the type of action being
brought, and the specific language of the U.C.C. statute of limitations before decid-
ing that the four-year statute of limitations applied. For a discussion of the purposes
of statutes of limitations, see note 25 supra. For a discussion of statutes of limitations
in connection with the U.C.C. and personal injury conflict, see Note, supra note 25.
But see Case Comment, UC.C-Statute of Limitations-Conficts Between Personal Injug
and Sales Contract Statutes of Limitations, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 201 (1972).
For a discussion of the specific language of the U.C.C. statute of limitation, see
notes 96-98 and accompanying text infra.
91. Although the Williams court refused to reestablish the concept of privity in
connection with the applicable statute of limitations, it is submitted that the U.C.C.
adopts a privity of contract requirement in the notice section. See U.C.C. § 2-607
comment 5 (1978). Under the U.C.C., after acceptance of the tender of delivery, a
1983-84] 1215
21
Shaffner: Uniform Commercial Code - Statute of Limitations - U.C.C. Four-Ye
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
court in Salvador lnoted, the extension of warranties under the U.C.C. was a
judicial perogative; the judiciary had the power and should have exercised
this power to determine the appropriate statute of limitations that would
govern these third party actions.9 2
The Williams court stated that the mere fact that an action for breach of
warranty sought recovery for personal injuries should not justify any devia-
tion from the U.C.C. prescribed statute of limitations. 93 It is submitted that
the U.C.C. statute of limitations should not govern third party claims under
the U.C.C. not because the warranty claim seeks recovery for personal injury
claims but, rather, as recognized by the court in Hahn, because the U.C.C.
statute of limitations is not the prescribed statute with regard to those
claims.94 It is suggested that the U.C.C. statute was intended to govern
purely commercial transactions between the contracting parties and was not
intended to apply to third party strict products liability claims. 95 The four-
buyer must notify the seller of a breach of warranty within a reasonable time after
the buyer discovers or should have discovered the breach or be barred from any
remedy under the U.C.C. Id § 2-607(3)(a). Third parties are exempted, in part,
from the notice requirement because they have nothing to do with acceptance. Id.
§ 2-607 comment 5 (1978). However, the third party must notify the seller of the
occurrence of an injury once he has become aware of it. Id Similarly, it is submitted
that the Wilhams court should have recognized that the U.C.C. statute of limitations
is without benefit to third parties since they have nothing to do with delivery and,
therefore applied the two-year personal injury statute of limitation running from the
date of injury. See Murray, Products Liabiity, supra note 30, at 268. Third party bene-
ficiaries do not fall within the reason of the notice section because they have nothing
to do with acceptance or delivery. Id (citing U.C.C. § 2-607 comment J).
92. The U.C.C. provides three alternatives for the extension of the benefits of
warranties to third parties. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978). See also note 18 and accompa-
nying text supra. A comment to that section specifically states that, beyond these
alternatives, the section is neutral and does not affect the developing case law.
U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3 (1978). Most courts, including those in Pennsylvania,
have expanded the protection afforded by the U.C.C. to those not in privity of con-
tract with the defendant through the use of this comment. See, e.g., Salvador v. At-
lantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974). See also Note, supra note 17,
at 599.
It is submitted that, since the courts have judicially extended the protection of
the U.C.C. beyond that expressly permitted by the statute and allowed suits by third
parties, the courts should also independently choose the appropriate statute of limita-
tions applicable to that judicially created cause of action. See, e.g., Salvador!!, 256 Pa.
Super. at 340-41, 389 A.2d at 1154.
93. 502 Pa. at 568-69, 467 A.2d at 817.
94. See Murray, roducts Liability, supra note 30 at 269-70. Dean Murray rea-
soned as follows:
The language and purpose of Section 2-725 permit a strong argument that
it should not apply to third party beneficiaries protected under the literal
language of the Code or judicial extensions thereof. . . . [T]he non-buyer
plaintiff who is personally injured as a result of a defective product has a
tort action which should not be governed by a statute of limitations which
is clearly designed for use in contractual situations.
Id
95. Id at 267. Primarily, Chapter 2 of the U.C.C. deals with situations resulting
from the sale of goods between a buyer and seller in the "conventional commercial
setting and claims based on economic loss or loss-of-the-bargain." Heavner v. Uni-
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year statute is contained in the section titled "Statutes of Limitations in Con-
tracts for Sale" and is directed toward a situation involving a commercial
transaction. 96 Section 2-725 requires an action to be commenced within
four years after the accrual of the cause of action.9 7 The action accrues at
tender of delivery regardless of the aggrieved party's knowledge of the
breach. 98 At the time of delivery the only available and relevant parties are
the buyer and the seller, so the running of the statute of limitations upon
delivery can only be relevant to these two parties.99 If it were otherwise, as
the Salvador Ilcourt noted, the court's strict reliance on the U.C.C. statute of
limitations can lead to the absurd result that the statute could begin to run
or could even expire before the third party plaintiff ever received the prod-
uct or before the plaintiff suffered injury.10 0 It is submitted that this is fur-
royal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 153, 305 A.2d 412, 424 (1973). The U.C.C. statute of limita-
tions, it has been said, "explicitly relates to actions 'for breach of any contract for
sale' and presumably was not intended to apply to tort actions between consumers
and manufacturers who were never in any commercial relationship or setting."
Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 143, 238 A.2d 169, 176 (1968).
96. See U.C.C. § 2-725 (1978). The comment to the U.C.C. statute of limita-
tions states that "[t]his Article takes sales contracts out of the general laws limiting the
time for commencing contractual actions and selects a four year period as the most
appropriate to modern business practice." Id comment (emphasis added). See also
Murray, Products Liability, supra note 30, at 267.
97. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978).
98. d § 2-725(2).
99. See Murray, Products Liabii'ty, supra note 30, at 267. Dean Murray reached
this conclusion after an analysis of the specific language of the statute and its implica-
tions. Dean Murray made the following observations:
1) Delivery is made only to the buyer.
2) If there is a breach of warranty upon delivery only the buyer has a
cause of action.
3) Only the buyer and seller have a legal relationship at that time.
4) The U.C.C. states that the cause of action accrues regardless of the
aggrieved party's knowledge of the breach.
5) The U.C.C. defines an aggrieved party as anyone entitled to a remedy.
6) When the statute starts to run at tender of delivery, the only possible
aggrieved party is the buyer so the buyer is the only party entitled to a
remedy at that time.
Id
100. Id at 269. See also Stevenson, supra note 28, at 327-34. If delivery of the
defective product to the buyer occurs more than four years before the plaintiff is
injured, the plaintiff will be barred from bringing a breach of warranty claim. How-
ever, if the product is delivered less than four years before injury under the same
factual situation, the plaintiff will be able to proceed under the U.C.C.
This was the result in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253
N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969) (plaintiff barred from bringing action seven
years from tender of delivery after she was seriously injured by plate glass door).
Mendel has been expressly overruled. See Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37
N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975) (plaintiffs, injured more than
eight years after delivery of centrifuge extractors, permitted to bring action within
three years after date of injury). The fact that Pennsylvania would allow a plaintiff
barred from recovery after four years from tender of delivery to recover under § 402A
within two years from the time of injury should not alter the conclusion that the
present interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations is inaccurate: "[T]he
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ther evidence of the inapplicability of the U.C.C. statute of limitations to
injured third parties.
The impact of the Williams decision will be most significant in regard to
its disparate treatment of injured consumers depending on how close in time
their injury is to the delivery of the product to the buyer. An injured con-
sumer that fails to bring a strict products liability cause of action within the
two-year personal injury statute of limitation may have up to two additional
years to bring an action for breach of implied warranty depending on the
accidental circumstances of when the product was delivered to the buyer. 0 '1
Given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's emphasis on legal symmetry, it is
unfortunate that the court failed to apply the two-year personal injury stat-
ute of limitation to third party breach of warranty actions, and thus failed to
lend necessary uniformity to the area of products liability.1
0 2
Paula D. Shaffier
fact that a just result is possible notwithstanding an unfortunate interpretation of the
Code statute of limitations does not support the vitally important value of law settle-
ment." Murray, Products Liabdiiy, supra note 30, at 269.
101. See Murray, Products Liability, supra note 30 at 270. Dean Murray posed the
following hypothetical to illustrate the asymmetric result created by the court:
For example, if a non-buyer-plaintiff is personally injured and does not
commence his action until twenty-five months after the injury, he may not
use 402A; and, if the product was delivered to the buyer more than four
years before he commences his action, neither may he use the Code. On the
other hand, non-buyer B, under otherwise identical circumstances may use
the Code if the product happened to be delivered to the buyer less than four
years from the time the action is commenced, though the action is com-
menced twenty-five months after the injury was sustained. This irreconcila-
ble possibility should be eliminated if for no other reason than to foster the
. ..underlying purposes of the Code, simplification and uniformity ....
Id.
102. Id. at 274. As Dean Murray noted, "only the most myopic and procrustean
interpretation of the Code limitations section can lead to the chaotic alternative
which currently prevails in Pennsylvania." Id It is unfortunate that the court in
Williams chose not to "remove this vestige of irrationality." Id
It has been suggested that "courts. . . have tended to devote most of their ener-
gies to gymnastic exercises, juggling result-oriented language to permit the plaintiff to
recover." Note, supra note 17, at 608. In fairness to the Wilhams court, it must be
noted that, when faced with seriously injured plaintiffs, the intricacies of the U.C.C.
statute of limitations probably do not seem overwhelmingly compelling, particularly
when other arguments that would permit the plaintiffs to recover are also plausible.
However, the fact that another theory which allows recovery is possible despite an
unfortunate interpretation of the U.C.C. statute of limitations also does not "support
the vitally important value of law settlement." Murray, Products Liability, supra note
30, at 269.
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